

Norfolk's Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) response to inspections published by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS)

Section 55 of the Police Act 1996 (as amended by section 37 of the Policing and Crime Act 2017) requires local policing bodies to respond and publish comments on all inspection reports pertaining to your force within 56 days of report publication.

Inspection Title:

An inspection of the police's role in safety advisory groups: planning for major public events

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[An inspection of the police's role in safety advisory groups: planning for major public events - His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services](#)

Section 55 Response Deadline:

30/10/2026

Key Findings

On 31 October 2025, the Home Secretary commissioned His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) under section 54(2B) of the Police Act 1996 to inspect the contributions police forces in England and Wales make to Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) and other bodies responsible for public safety and the licensing of high-profile public events.

As part of this commission, on 27 November 2025 the Home Secretary requested a rapid inspection of the match assessment and categorisation that West Midlands Police provided to the Birmingham City Council SAG in respect of the Aston Villa versus Maccabi Tel Aviv fixture on 6 November 2025. HMICFRS refer to this first element as phase 1 of their inspection.

In phase 1 of their inspection, the Inspectorate examined:

- the match assessment and categorisation that West Midlands Police carried out before the fixture; and
- the extent to which the information and intelligence the force gave the SAG accurately reflected the full information and intelligence picture, including information and intelligence the force had received from the Netherlands Police.

In phase 2 of this commission, HMICFRS evaluated how police forces take into account the full range of strategic considerations when providing their safety advice. It also required the Inspectorate to examine:

- the risk appetite of forces in their advice and assessment;
- the degree to which the police take into account wider community impacts and other factors that might be relevant (such as an event's national or international significance) beyond narrow community safety considerations;
- whether forces strike the right balance between these factors; and
- how forces communicate their assessments and contributions to the public.

HMICFRS carried out fieldwork in seven police forces in England and Wales. This consisted of:

- a document review, in which HMICFRS examined 856 documents, including operational plans for a range of major public events, policies, national guidance and SAG records;
- a total of 62 interviews with police officers and staff in police forces, including senior officers with command responsibility and event planning leads;
- a total of 21 interviews with the chairs of local SAGs and event organisers; and
- a further 30 interviews with chief officers, national police leads, government officials, Police Scotland, Police Service of Northern Ireland and external organisations.

HMICFRS sent all 43 police forces in England and Wales a questionnaire. The Inspectorate used this to collate the number of SAGs they work with, the types of events they support and the role each force plays in planning for public safety.

The police operate under statutory and common law (long-standing custom, based on previous legal cases) powers and duties regarding public order public safety (POPS) policing. POPS policing covers events where there is a reasonably foreseeable risk to public order or public safety. These include protests, festivals, sporting events, and disorder. College of Policing advice is available to forces via authorised professional practice (APP). The APP provides consistency across all forces and offers guidance on specific areas of policing. It defines the main responsibilities for policing. These are:

- preventing and detecting crime;
- preventing or stopping a breach of the peace;

- traffic regulation (only under statutory powers relating to events);
- activating contingency plans when there is an immediate threat to life; and
- co-ordinating emergency response activities associated with a major incident taking place at the event in line with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP).

HMICFRS found that in most forces inspected, the event organisers and police commanders recognised their own responsibilities. But they didn't always recognise that they shared these responsibilities. The Inspectorate found examples where the police had stepped in to manage public safety because the event organisers couldn't safely carry out their role.

In some of the large events reviewed, event security took responsibility for the area inside the event footprint. The police remained on standby, outside the arena, to respond if needed or when event management called them to take over responsibility. In several other community cultural events where the event organiser employed private stewards and security, HMICFRS heard that the police routinely had to intervene to deal with crowd control and safety matters.

The Inspectorate found that on many occasions, police commanders deployed a level of resources that reflected the extent to which they could trust, or rely on, private security. They found the lack of training and awareness for police officers and staff who work with SAGs leads them to take an inappropriately high level of responsibility for safety planning away from the SAG. HMICFRS found that in some forces there wasn't enough clarity about what each organisation involved in the SAG was responsible for.

HMICFRS state in their report that the legal powers to ensure safety at events aren't sufficient to mitigate risks to the public. There was a gap in legislation and powers available to the police relating to events. Sections 11–16 of the Public Order Act 1986 provide the police with powers to manage public processions and assemblies. The Act requires organisers to notify the police in advance of any procession. The notification should include details such as the time, date, location, route and number of people organisers expect to attend. This allows forces to impose conditions to prevent serious public disorder, damage to property or serious disruption to the community. In extreme circumstances, a force can apply to the Home Secretary (via the local authority) to ban a procession. But this doesn't apply to assemblies and processions that customarily take place in a force area, such as annual cultural events. And it doesn't extend to a general public safety risk. However, the risk of terrorism, public disorder, damage or criminality at other events is very real.

HMICFRS found that clear command structures exist for POPS commanded events. They found that all the forces inspected followed the College of Policing POPS APP by assigning trained and accredited POPS commanders to events.

The Inspectorate saw limited training on working with SAGs within the bronze, silver and gold POPS courses. All POPS commanders interviewed explained that they had attended the College of Policing events course. While there was a requirement to attend command reaccreditation, there was no requirement to attend an event refresher course. Some

commanders said the SAG engagement in any event depended on the police commander responsible, their level of training and experience with SAGs. Many commanders stated they needed better knowledge and training for SAG meetings and in making and delivering risk assessments. The responses to HMICFRS' questionnaire to forces showed that only 23 of 43 forces had standardised processes and policies for working with SAGs in their force area.

HMICFRS identified that a lack of oversight and regulation creates inconsistent safety planning. The majority of police commanders and representatives from national police bodies interviewed stated they needed greater clarity. Many stated they would benefit from an extension of the role of Sports Grounds Safety Authority (SGSA) and Green Guide so that these don't focus only on the top four tiers of domestic football. This would provide consistency across all sports. HMICFRS interviewed senior police officers and representatives from the College of Policing. They said it would be better if the Purple Guide had the same level of legal standing, oversight and scrutiny for events as the Green Guide and the SGSA provide for football.

The Inspectorate found that the training and guidance for the police in event planning and working with SAGs needs to improve. At the time of their inspection, there was no consistency in how SAGs are run and held. This could be because so many SAG attendees, including the police representatives, have had no formal SAG training. Of the forces inspected, none could produce a formal record to identify who had received SAG training. HMICFRS found for smaller events that didn't require a formal POPS command structure, it was likely the police officers responsible had received no training in SAGs. The training and guidance available to police commanders and planning staff doesn't set out the criteria for events that should go to a SAG. Neither does it advise on who should attend a SAG and how it should share information and intelligence. The Inspectorate did find some examples of good practice, where the force was clearly invested in a partnership approach to SAGs. Greater Manchester Police routinely invited SAG partners to attend the silver commanders' planning meetings. Consequently, while the planning meetings and SAG meetings were independent of each other, they were better informed. The force made sure that the appropriate ranks and roles attended SAG meetings.

HMICFRS suggest within the report that forces should raise safety concerns and direct event organisers to the SAG. The College of Policing POPS events APP provides similar guidance to that found in the Purple Guide. It states that event organisers have overall responsibility for event management including responsibility for public safety. Most of the forces inspected explained they could refer events to a SAG. Only two forces told HMICFRS they couldn't convene a SAG when they felt one was necessary. The Inspectorate found there wasn't a clearly defined process for managing this. They were also concerned about smaller events that don't attract a formal POPS command structure. In these circumstances, it is possible that the police officers involved haven't received relevant training and may not be aware of the role of the SAG, or even that they exist. This results in different forces co-ordinating public safety responsibilities using a variety of methods. POPS commanders and force planners should provide event organisers with the contact details for the relevant SAG.

Responding to HMICFRS' questionnaire, 36 of 43 forces confirmed that a force representative attended every SAG meeting in their force area. The Inspectorate found that for many events, forces send officers or staff to the SAG who aren't of sufficient rank to make decisions on behalf of the force. In many of the SAGs held for sporting events, the person representing the force was a police constable or equivalent grade.

Some forces had clear command allocation procedures. HMICFRS found that for some large events, forces allocated POPS commanders their respective roles before any SAG meeting. They found that for some of the largest and most significant events, the POPS silver commander attended the SAG or multi-agency planning meetings. Too often, the Inspectorate found silver commanders chairing the planning meetings and, therefore, taking too much responsibility for safety at the event.

In some of the events inspected, HMICFRS found forces having to communicate directly with the public about safety concerns. In one such event, the force couldn't secure the agreement of all the respective parties. The force recognised that it lacked powers to meaningfully reduce or control risks. The concern related to crowd control and a risk of a crushing incident. When the force felt it had received little support from other emergency services and other parties concerned with the event it went public with its concern.

The College of Policing training and guidance for POPS commanders states that forces should make sure they deploy appropriately trained and accredited POPS commanders to manage spontaneous and planned POPS events and operations. But the training and guidance isn't clear enough about the risk of commanders taking responsibility for multiple concurrent events.

HMICFS found that there is inconsistency in the documented protocols for a handover of command responsibility between the police and event organisers. The College of Policing POPS guidance for police commanders advises that there should be documented command protocols between event organisers and the police. The protocols should detail the circumstances in which the event organiser can no longer control the event or elements of it. Sometimes these protocols are referred to as contingency plans. By having such protocols, event organisers implicitly accept that they don't have sole responsibility for public safety. The Inspectorate found some examples of good practice, particularly for events at sports stadiums, where there were detailed contingency arrangements. They included options to allow the police to take control over defined sections of the stadium. And there were protocols to return command to the organiser when it was safe. The large music festivals reviewed had comprehensive and thorough event safety plans. They also included protocols for handing command responsibility to the police should they become unable to manage a risk or response to an incident.

In forces managing larger or high-risk events, there were initial SAG discussions, but the safety planning moved to multi-agency planning meeting structures. HMICFRS found in most cases; forces chaired and administered these planning meetings. There does need to be effective planning, but they found some forces effectively replaced the SAG chair and took responsibility for safety planning. This exposes forces to unnecessary risk.

Forces should consider information and intelligence management when preparing for POPS deployments. Further to this, the APP specifically states that forces need information and intelligence throughout the lifecycle of an event or incident. The guidance lists the three event phases:

- pre-event;
- during the event or incident; and
- following the event or incident.

HMICFRS found police forces used different intelligence models depending on the event and extenuating circumstances. In some of the events considered, the police force had a dedicated intelligence function in the event command structure. This made sure that forces properly evaluated all the information and intelligence they used in risk assessments. Commanders could therefore decide whether it was reliable, important or relevant.

For most football matches, forces don't use a dedicated intelligence function. Dedicated football officers (DFOs) usually manage the flow of information between football clubs and forces and police bodies both national and international. In most cases, DFOs hadn't received any formal training or accreditation in managing intelligence.

The Inspectorate state within their report that when forces use artificial intelligence tools to develop information and intelligence, they need to make sure the products are accurate. Many of the forces inspected didn't use artificial intelligence (AI) tools when they prepared intelligence reports and risk assessments for events. One force told the Inspectorate that their senior officers encouraged officers and staff to extend the use of AI across a range of police activities. HMICFRS were reassured that this force used a bespoke AI product and that they had implemented safeguards. The Inspectorate found that another force had used AI, in the form of Microsoft Copilot, to research information about an event. The material these searches returned formed part of the force risk assessment and SAG briefing document. HMICFRS found that some of the material was inaccurate. They were also concerned to find that senior commanders responsible for the event didn't know that the force had used AI.

Forces share information and intelligence more effectively at multi-agency planning meetings than they do at SAGs. HMICFRS found that most forces use a range of roles to support the flow of information and intelligence at public events. These include:

- community bronze commander: responsible for engagement and information sharing;
- intelligence bronze commander: leading professional intelligence functions; and
- counter-terrorism security coordinator.

The Inspectorate were confident that most forces understood the importance of these roles.

Forces use a national risk matrix to classify football fixtures but not for other public events. The United Kingdom Football Policing Unit (UKFPU) has developed a risk matrix for assessing and categorising football fixtures. All forces have adopted this matrix. So there is

a consistent understanding of risk at these events across the UK. Essentially, the risk matrix attributes a numerical score for the various aspects of a fixture. In addition to fixtures that have no police presence, there are three bands: high, medium and low risk. The consistent scoring of football events allows forces, clubs and national police support functions to tailor their response accordingly.

HMICFRS found all the operational plans for the various events inspected included a risk assessment of some description. For the football events, the risk assessment followed the UKFPU risk matrix, but for other public events, forces used their own risk assessment process. Unsurprisingly, they were all different. Some of the police commanders interviewed told the Inspectorate that they preferred using a bespoke risk assessment process as it allowed them to reflect the unique nature of an event. However, the majority of people interviewed stated that the absence of a national risk matrix for public events was problematic. A national risk matrix would make sure that forces take a consistent approach to risk assessments.

Inconsistency in creating and sharing community impact assessments means some forces don't always see the full picture. When forces effectively use community impact assessments (CIAs), they help to inform the public about an event and identify any community tension. But CIAs can also provide access to valuable community intelligence that can enhance police risk assessments. HMICFRS found good examples where police forces used CIAs, with most events having a nominated community bronze commander. The Inspectorate were also pleased to find forces sharing CIAs with the SAG.

Large public events can also affect businesses, not always positively. A business impact assessment can help forces to consider a wider range of community concerns when they plan major events. Only one force told HMICFRS they carried out a business impact assessment.

There is no clear process to escalate safety concerns other than within the POPS command structure, or police hierarchy.

HMICFRS found for those events, including football matches, that have a full POPS command structure, there is a clear internal escalation process. This escalates through the bronze, silver and gold commander, irrespective of who attends a SAG. But the Inspectorate found that due to the demands on police commanders, forces often sent police planners to represent their force at a SAG. Too many forces had no clear escalation process for their officers or staff to highlight risks that reach beyond the force boundary.

The Inspectorate suggest that there appears to be confusion about critical incidents, or a reluctance to declare them. The College of Policing provides guidance to police forces on managing critical incidents, The guidance to police officers and staff sets out the process for declaring a critical incident. In simple terms, any officer or staff member can flag an incident as critical, but only a senior officer, such as a force duty inspector, can formally declare one. There is no mandatory requirement for informing a chief officer or the relevant police and crime commissioner (PCC) or mayoral equivalent. The Inspectorate believe that a PCC or mayoral equivalent has an important role to play in managing critical incidents.

Not least, the support they can provide through communication with partners and politicians. By not declaring critical incidents, forces and their respective PCC or mayoral equivalent miss opportunities to improve.

When the police need to provide special police services (SPS) that go beyond their core duty, there is legislation and guidance available. Police forces can charge for providing SPS. HMICFRS found that police forces experience inconsistency in the way different event organisers approach SPS agreements. Some football clubs don't use any police resources within their stadium during matches. Instead, they rely on private stewards. In these circumstances, they don't request any SPS, and police forces deploy resources outside the stadium and in town centres or transport hubs as part of their core duty. When a football club asks a police force to provide resources within its stadium, it needs an SPS agreement. In this case, should matters develop that require additional police resources in the stadium, the force can charge for all resources under the SPS agreement. If there isn't an SPS agreement, the force can't claim charges against the football club for the cost when officers deploy spontaneously to disorder or safety issues inside the stadium. In the absence of formal SPS agreements some forces accept financial gestures of goodwill from event organisers.

Recommendations

There were 37 new recommendations made within the report, eleven of which are directed at Chief Constables nationally:

Recommendation 8:

By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should provide specific [safety advisory group](#) training for police safety advisory group attendees who aren't [public order public safety](#) trained.

Recommendation 9:

With immediate effect, all chief constables should satisfy themselves that their [officers](#) always use the crowd and event safety template when they engage with event organisers.

Recommendation 12:

By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should satisfy themselves that the demands on gold commanders are manageable and support public safety, especially where public safety events and other responsibilities happen concurrently.

Recommendation 14:

By 31 August 2027, all forces should have a documented handover protocol between the police and event organisers for command responsibility for all public events. This should state that forces may need to take command, to meet the core responsibilities of the police under common law (long-standing custom, based on previous legal cases).

Recommendation 19:

By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should take steps to make all [intelligence](#) products and [risk assessments](#) for public events, including football fixtures, comply with the refreshed [College of Policing guidance for intelligence management](#). They should have robust quality assurance checks for processes using artificial intelligence technology.

Recommendation 20:

By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should make sure a force [intelligence](#) representative attends [safety advisory groups](#) for those public events where a formal intelligence command structure is in place and shares any [risk assessment](#) in line with information sharing protocols.

Recommendation 22:

By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should make sure their forces complete [community impact assessments](#), business impact assessments and [people impact assessments](#) for events on a proportionate basis, in line with [College of Policing](#) guidance.

Recommendation 24:

By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should make sure the silver [public order public safety](#) commander (or their nominated deputy) attends all [safety advisory groups](#) that consider the events they command.

Recommendation 27:

With immediate effect, all police forces should decline any payment from private individuals or companies for the provision of police services at public events unless it complies with [section 25 of the Police Act 1996](#).

Recommendation 31:

By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should have the events portal available on their force website. They should submit relevant information and [intelligence](#), collected via the portal, to the [National Police Coordination Centre](#) strategic intelligence and briefing team.

Recommendation 33:

By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should make sure their force uses the new [National Police Coordination Centre](#) events risk matrix in operational planning for all public events.

Areas for Improvement

There were no areas for improvement.

Chief Constable response to report and any Recommendations/Areas for Improvement

I acknowledge the publication of His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) report, ***An inspection of the police's role in safety advisory groups: planning for major public events***, and its focus on strengthening the arrangements that support the safe and effective planning and management of public events.

The report identifies significant challenges within the current event-safety framework, concluding that policing is being required to manage public-safety risks within a system where legislation, governance, responsibilities, risk assessment and national standards are not consistently defined or applied. HMICFRS identifies the need for both wider reform at a national level and greater consistency in policing practice.

The report makes 37 recommendations across policing, government, and partner organisations, including eleven directed specifically to Chief Constables. Collectively, these recommendations seek to strengthen consistency, accountability, and assurance in how forces plan for public events, contribute to Safety Advisory Groups, and discharge their responsibilities in relation to public safety. I accept all eleven recommendations directed to Chief Constables.

An initial review of current arrangements against these recommendations has been undertaken to identify areas of existing compliance and any further activity required to address gaps and achieve the standards set by HMICFRS within the specified timescales.

This response sets out Norfolk Constabulary's position against each relevant recommendation, together with the action being taken where further work is required. Progress will be subject to appropriate governance, oversight and scrutiny to provide assurance that the recommendations are implemented effectively, identified improvements are delivered within the required timescales, and any resulting changes are fully embedded within force policy and practice.

Recommendation 8 : By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should provide specific safety advisory group training for police safety advisory group attendees who aren't public order public safety trained.

The Constabulary recognises the importance of ensuring that all police representatives attending Safety Advisory Groups (SAG) understand the purpose of the group, the scope of the police role, relevant legal considerations and their individual responsibilities, irrespective of whether they are trained in Public Order and Public Safety (POPS).

Delivery of the full recommendation is linked to the national training product to be developed by the College of Policing (Recommendation 7) by 31 August 2027. Once this product is available, the Constabulary will review it promptly and incorporate it into its local training and briefing arrangements. In the interim, local guidance will be developed for police SAG representatives who do not hold POPS accreditation. This will provide an initial

framework for attendance and decision-making pending the introduction of the national training product.

Recommendation 9: With immediate effect, all chief constables should satisfy themselves that their officers always use the crowd and event safety template when they engage with event organisers.

The Constabulary's initial assessment in response to this recommendation has identified that our use of the College of Policing crowd and event safety template is not yet consistent.

Following publication of the inspection report, the requirement to use the template where applicable has been communicated to all Public Order and Public Safety (POPS) Commanders and event single points of contact.

The Operational Support team are reviewing how use of the template can be made more accessible, consistently incorporated into event-planning arrangements, and subject to proportionate monitoring. This will include establishing an assurance mechanism through which the Constabulary can demonstrate that the template is being used whenever officers engage with event organisers.

Recommendation 12: By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should satisfy themselves that the demands on gold commanders are manageable and support public safety, especially where public safety events and other responsibilities happen concurrently.

Our initial assessment provides assurance that existing arrangements substantially meet the requirements of this recommendation.

The recruitment, availability, and deployment of POPS Gold Commanders are regularly considered through the Operational Support Governance Board. Horizon scanning is used to identify forthcoming demand and support planning for anticipated changes in Commander availability.

The Constabulary also benefits from a Section 22 collaboration agreement that enables POPS Gold and Silver commanders to operate across the Norfolk and Suffolk force areas. This provides additional resilience where public events coincide with other operational responsibilities.

The Constabulary will continue to monitor Gold Commander capacity, availability and resilience through established governance arrangements, with particular attention to periods of concurrent demand, to ensure sufficient command capability is maintained to meet foreseeable operational requirements.

Recommendation 14: By 31 August 2027, all forces should have a documented handover protocol between the police and event organisers for command responsibility for all public events. This should state that forces may need to take command, to meet the core responsibilities of the police under common law (long-standing custom, based on previous legal cases).

Existing arrangements already reflect the need for effective command handovers within the planning of events operating under a formal POPS command structure. However, the Constabulary recognises the need for these arrangements to be documented consistently and extended to public events where no formal POPS command structure is in place.

A formal handover protocol will be developed, clearly defining the distinction between the responsibilities of event organisers and the core responsibilities of the police. It will also set out the circumstances in which the police may need to assume command in order to discharge their responsibilities under common law.

The requirement for effective command handovers will be reinforced with POPS Commanders and incorporated into relevant tactical and operational plans. Complementary guidance will also be developed for event single points of contact supporting public events without a formal POPS command structure, ensuring a consistent approach across all relevant events. The Constabulary intends to implement and embed these revised arrangements from January 2027, ahead of the national deadline of 31 August 2027.

Recommendation 19: By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should take steps to make all intelligence products and risk assessments for public events, including football fixtures, comply with the refreshed College of Policing guidance for intelligence management. They should have robust quality assurance checks for processes using artificial intelligence technology.

Full implementation of this recommendation is dependent upon the College of Policing publishing its refreshed intelligence-management guidance (Recommendation 18) by 31 August 2027. Once issued, the Constabulary will assess current intelligence products, event risk assessments, and associated quality-assurance arrangements against the revised national guidance.

Pending publication of this guidance, the relevant learning from the HMICFRS inspection report, including the expectations relating to intelligence products for public events and football fixtures, has been communicated to Dedicated Football Officers and Event-Planning teams.

The Constabulary will also ensure that any process within scope that uses artificial intelligence technology is identified and considered against the quality-assurance requirements contained within the refreshed guidance. The current documentation does not establish whether any such process is presently being used, so this element will require explicit confirmation as part of the implementation work.

Recommendation 20: By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should make sure a force intelligence representative attends safety advisory groups for those public events where a formal intelligence command structure is in place and shares any risk assessment in line with information sharing protocols.

The Constabulary recognises that arrangements for intelligence representation at Safety Advisory Groups need to be applied consistently when a formal intelligence command structure is in place. For relevant POPS events, the Silver Commander will be responsible for ensuring that an appropriate force intelligence representative is nominated to attend the SAG and that any event risk assessment is shared in accordance with the applicable information-sharing protocols.

For football-related Safety Advisory Groups, the Dedicated Football Officer will continue to provide the intelligence function unless the circumstances of the event require a different or additional representative.

The requirement will be incorporated into the planned learning and communication package for POPS commanders. A proportionate means of recording attendance and the presentation or sharing of relevant risk assessments will also be established to support ongoing assurance.

Recommendation 22: By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should make sure their forces complete community impact assessments, business impact assessments and people impact assessments for events on a proportionate basis, in line with College of Policing guidance.

Community Impact Assessments are currently undertaken at a local level where identified as necessary. The constabulary recognises, however, that Community, Business and People Impact Assessments are not yet consistently incorporated into event-planning arrangements on a proportionate basis.

Full implementation will be informed by the amendments that will be made by the College of Policing to the national POPS Authorised Professional Practice (Recommendation 21) by 31 August 2027. Once the updated guidance is available, the Constabulary will review its arrangements and communicate the requirements to Local Policing Commanders, Local Policing teams, POPS Commanders, and other relevant event-planning personnel.

Pending publication of the refreshed Authorised Professional Practice by the College of Policing, the Constabulary will reinforce the expectation that existing impact-assessment arrangements are considered as part of event planning where relevant and proportionate.

Recommendation 24: By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should make sure the silver public order public safety commander (or their nominated deputy) attends all safety advisory groups that consider the events they command.

Existing practice substantially meets the requirements of this recommendation. Silver POPS Commanders, or an appropriately nominated deputy, routinely attend the Safety Advisory Groups considering events for which they hold command responsibility, with their involvement recorded within the relevant public order log.

In response to the findings of the HMICFRS inspection, the Constabulary will reinforce this expectation with its cadre of Silver Commanders. This requirement will also be included within the planned learning and communication package for POPS commanders.

Compliance will continue to be recorded through the relevant event-planning and command documentation.

Recommendation 27: With immediate effect, all police forces should decline any payment from private individuals or companies for the provision of police services at public events unless it complies with section 25 of the Police Act 1996.

The Constabulary is reviewing its current arrangements to provide assurance that any payments accepted from private individuals or organisations for the provision of police services at public events are made in accordance with section 25 of the Police Act 1996. Should any arrangement be identified that falls outside the statutory framework, appropriate action will be taken promptly to address this.

Going forward, the provision of police services at public events will be required to comply with the relevant Special Police Services arrangements and associated requirements. This expectation will be clearly communicated to relevant Commanders, event planners and business areas to support a consistent and compliant approach across the Constabulary.

Recommendation 31: By 31 August 2027, all chief constables should have the events portal available on their force website. They should submit relevant information and intelligence, collected via the portal, to the National Police Coordination Centre strategic intelligence and briefing team.

Initial contact has been made with the National Police Coordination Centre Strategic Intelligence and Briefing Team to clarify the arrangements for accessing and implementing the national events portal.

Once those arrangements have been confirmed, the Constabulary will make the portal accessible through its public-facing website and take appropriate steps to promote awareness and encourage its use. Implementation arrangements will also ensure that relevant information and intelligence received through the portal is appropriately assessed and, where required, submitted to the National Police Coordination Centre Strategic Intelligence and Briefing Team in accordance with the national process.

Recommendation 33: By 31 March 2027, all chief constables should make sure their force uses the new National Police Coordination Centre events risk matrix in operational planning for all public events.

The Constabulary currently uses established events, football, and counter-terrorism risk matrices to support the assessment of risk and inform the planning of relevant events. These arrangements provide an established framework for assessing event-related risk pending the development of the new National Police Coordination Centre events risk matrix under Recommendation 32.

Once the national events risk matrix has been published, the Constabulary will review and adopt it for operational planning for all public events within scope. Its introduction will be

communicated to relevant planning teams and incorporated into our local event-planning arrangements.

PCC response to report and any Recommendations/Areas for Improvement

I welcome HMICFRS's report, "*An inspection of the police's role in safety advisory groups: planning for major public events*", and the opportunity it provides to strengthen the way policing, local authorities, event organisers and other partners work together to keep people safe at public events. The report highlights important national issues relating to governance, accountability, training, risk assessment and the respective responsibilities of agencies involved in event planning and delivery.

The inspection found that, while police forces and partners are often working hard to manage risks effectively, there is significant inconsistency in how Safety Advisory Groups (SAGs) operate across the country. HMICFRS identified a lack of clarity around responsibilities, uneven levels of training, inconsistency in risk assessment processes, and occasions where police forces have assumed responsibilities that properly sit with event organisers or other agencies. The report also highlights the need for improved intelligence management, stronger governance arrangements, clearer command handover protocols, and more consistent consideration of community, business and wider societal impacts when planning major events.

I note that the Chief Constable has accepted all eleven recommendations directed to Chief Constables and has undertaken an initial assessment of Norfolk Constabulary's current arrangements against those recommendations. I welcome this positive response and the commitment to implement any necessary improvements within the timescales set by HMICFRS.

I am particularly encouraged by the Constabulary's recognition of the importance of providing appropriate training for officers and staff attending Safety Advisory Groups, improving the consistent use of national templates and guidance, strengthening arrangements for intelligence management and risk assessment, and developing formal protocols that clearly define the circumstances in which command responsibility may transfer between event organisers and policing. These actions directly address key themes raised by the Inspectorate and will help ensure that Norfolk continues to discharge its responsibilities effectively while maintaining appropriate boundaries between policing and wider event management functions.

The report also reinforces the importance of effective partnership working. Public safety at major events is a shared responsibility, and safeguarding communities requires strong collaboration between the police, local authorities, emergency services, event organisers and other stakeholders. I welcome the Constabulary's commitment to strengthening its contribution to these arrangements while supporting greater clarity and consistency in decision-making and accountability.

As Police and Crime Commissioner, I will maintain oversight of Norfolk Constabulary's progress in implementing the recommendations directed to Chief Constables and will seek assurance through existing governance and performance arrangements that the required improvements are delivered and embedded.

Overall, I am satisfied that Norfolk Constabulary has responded positively and constructively to the findings of this inspection. I support the Chief Constable's acceptance of the recommendations and his commitment to strengthening arrangements where required. The implementation of these recommendations will help ensure that public events across Norfolk continue to be planned and managed safely, proportionately and in partnership with those organisations that share responsibility for public safety.

For Office Use Only:

- Response submitted to the HMICFRS Monitoring Portal.
- Response forwarded to the Chief Constable.
- Response forwarded to the Norfolk Police and Crime Panel.
- Response published on the OPCCN website.